Chinese Influence in European Academia

The recent crackdowns on Chinese students and allegations of espionage within US universities, initiated by President Donald Trump, ignited curiosity about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence in shaping academia in free societies. The first Trump administration began cracking down on Chinese government-backed Confucius Institutes (CI) in 2018. His first tenure led to a bill banning the Department of Defense from funding Chinese language instruction by CIs or any institution hosting a CI. Moreover, reports of espionage activities involving Chinese students and faculty, as well as intellectual property theft and influence over sinology departments, have emerged from multiple U.S. universities, including the renowned Harvard University. This has prompted President Trump’s administration to revoke visas for citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), particularly those connected to the CCP, during his second term in office this year.

Amidst the US-China geopolitical volatility and the continuation of trade tensions, Trump has agreed to back down on visa crackdowns and revocations as the trade talks continue. Nevertheless, Chinese influence in free societies, particularly within universities and academia across Europe, has exposed the malign activities of the CCP across the Atlantic. European countries are adopting a fragmented approach to addressing the risks posed by the CCP to academic freedom throughout the continent.

Research collaboration and academic exchange are integral to learning and enhancing knowledge that aids innovation and benefits the overall society. However, the PRC’s governance model, which is characterised as autocratic, stands in stark contrast to the democratic academic framework that promotes free thought and expression prevalent across Europe. The European Commission (EC) proposed adding research security statutes within the existing economic security strategy, amplifying the ongoing security risks of research collaboration with foreign actors posing risks to sensitive research, such as critical technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), advanced semiconductors, quantum, and biotechnology. Likewise, continuous interference in social science and humanities studies threatens European democracies’ values and quality of education across the continent.

Unlike in the US, the EC’s proposal does not explicitly state the PRC. Still, IP theft, dual-use applications, and a threat to academic freedom and censorship often refer to PRC activities in academia. The PRC is keenly focused on advancing critical technologies and promoting narratives that favor its interests while simultaneously suppressing discussions on sensitive topics such as human rights issues, Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, and other such subjects. Additionally, the PRC engages in the dissemination of disinformation regarding these issues to further its agenda.

In February this year, the PRC published a Blueprint for Building a Strong Education System by 2035, reconfiguring global education governance to suit the PRC’s national interests. The document aims to achieve this objective by increasing international exchange programs, research collaborations, and joint laboratories and attracting foreign enrollment. The PRC’s previous controversial Thousand Talents Program, known for technology transfer and dubious affiliations incidents in Western academia circles, and research collaborations that were later to be associated with the PRC’s military-civil fusion have caused some Western intelligence agencies to issue warnings on research collaboration with Chinese universities and research institutes and traveling to China for academic purposes. The PRC’s past conduct in global academia indicates that the new Blueprint could amplify the PRC agenda in foreign academia.

The PRC has influenced European academia to suit its national interests in numerous ways. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), Imperial College London, from 2012 to 2022, hosted joint labs with PRC defense companies such as the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), and the Beijing Institute for Aeronautical Materials (BIAM). The Chinese institutes and companies held links to the PRC’s military arm, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the joint labs were discontinued after the UK government rejected their export license application.

In Germany, a research collaboration between Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen (RWTH), the Northwestern University of Applied Sciences in Switzerland, and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) in 2013 launched the Artificial Assisted Heart Overseas Research and Development Institution, which contributed to the PRC’s dual-use application. A seemingly innocent collaboration in advancing medical technology later revealed that the technology in artificial heart development is similar to that of missile control systems and that CALT is a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation that supplies missiles, rockets, and satellites to the PLA.

While in Czechia in 2015, Charles University established the Czech-Chinese Centre, led by Miloš Balabán, who also led the University’s Centre for Security Policy, aimed at promoting research and education focused on political, economic, legal, social, territorial, media, cultural, and security studies between Czechia and the PRC. The centre repeatedly hosted conferences funded by the PRC Embassy in Prague, in which the themes exclusively promoted pro-Beijing narratives. Balabán was likewise discovered to promote pro-Beijing narratives in other positions within the Czech Ministry of Interior and the annual Prague Security Conference. The centre closed in 2019 after the PRC Embassy funding scandal was uncovered, and Balabán, along with two other faculty members, were fired from the university.

Over the years, Confucius Institutes developed a negative reputation for spreading Chinese propaganda in host countries, leading to many being closed down in the US and across Europe. Confucius Institutes function as nonprofit public institutions operated by a Chinese organisation or the Office of Chinese Language Council International, a branch of the PRC’s Ministry of Education, usually in collaboration with a host university, college, or nonprofit organisation. Apart from accusations of pushing a pro-Beijing narrative, there is unease over the PRC’s involvement in using the institute to surveil Chinese and Hong Kong students and suppress academic freedom. Moreover, according to The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Confucius Institutes are subject to heavy oversight from the United Front Work Department, which functions as the CCP’s propaganda and influence vehicle abroad. In 2019, Lithuania and Latvia’s security agencies warned of the PRC’s influence operations through Confucius Institutes.

An EU-wide approach toward academic security and research collaboration is still being debated. Some policymakers are more hawkish toward research collaboration with China in fields deemed critical to European security, such as AI or quantum computing. In contrast, other policymakers emphasise collaboration while implementing security guidelines. In 2022, the EC issued a toolkit providing guidelines on foreign interference in research and innovation. In 2024, the European Council adopted a recommendation to enhance research security and provide guidelines for member states when collaborating with international partners. Nevertheless, the EU’s actions are preliminary and can be disregarded by member states, particularly those with extensive PRC ties, though some are taking proactive measures to safeguard their academia from malign influence.

The Netherlands has adopted evolving guidelines in collaboration with Dutch universities, research institutions, the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Dutch Research Council. These guidelines tackle export controls, ethical considerations, academic freedom, influence operations, and the safety of researchers and students at Dutch universities. Czechia has formally adopted a discourse of countering malign foreign interference, and many universities and research institutions have supported security measures. However, whether these measures are implemented is up to individual universities and their faculty. Academia is considered decentralised in Germany; national measures remain limited to measures for export control, and the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control, which issued the measures, can only act if approached by researchers.

This year, Denmark began implementing a screening system for potential incoming researchers and administrative staff from countries considered ‘risk’ countries, such as the PRC, Iran, and Russia, to prevent espionage or malign foreign interference. The screening system will apply to research collaborations, staff travel, critical research, and end-of-contract procedures. This type of screening model might also be implemented in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. While in Sweden and Finland, the governments have issued guidelines for academic cooperation with China, other European universities have reported being regularly in touch with their intelligence services for guidance, such as the University of Leuven in Belgium.

As geopolitical tensions intensify, malign foreign influence in academia is expected to rise. The race to develop and safeguard critical technology and shape narratives is essential for countries to gain the upper hand over their adversaries. The PRC governance model, unfair economic practices, influence operations, and challenges to the rules-based order pose a security issue to Europe and all democracies and free societies. In academia, research collaborations, faculty and student exchanges, and other cooperations are considered essential to the development and education provided to future generations. However, the open and collaborative nature of many European universities and research institutes requires prudence during heightened geopolitical tensions, particularly concerning critical technological development and cutting-edge research. This caution is necessary to protect against potential technology transfer, intellectual property theft, and influence in the social sciences and humanities, areas in which the PRC has shown a willingness to act to advance its national interests and military objectives.

The EU has issued guidelines and recommendations to its member states, and some states have taken their approach to handling interference to varying degrees. However, Europe’s academia primarily operates autonomously, adapting to state guidelines according to its will. The permissiveness of European academia and the fragmented approach of member states and the EU towards research and academic security require greater convergence and understanding to create meaningful policy actions to safeguard against malign foreign interference and influence.