The Future of European Climate Politics

The European Project in 2024

In 2024, the world is confronted by a challenging political context: conflicts in Europe and the Middle East rage, economic crises following the COVID pandemic pervade the globe and ecological catastrophe (IPCC, 2014) awaits in the near-future. This complex of issues represents a titanic challenge to the international community that can only be adequately resolved with an equally Herculean series of political solutions.

Meanwhile, the old and familiar force of populism is emerging once again, thriving on the political discontent that characterises the present condition across the globe. This has manifested itself electorally in the centre of West’s geopolitical powers of the US, the UK, and the EU, most notably in France, Germany and Italy. In each, populist platforms share a common theme: a rebuke of international cooperation and institutions alike. This could hamstring international cooperation that resolves common problems, thereby reproducing the economic, ecological and diplomatic crises that constitute the international community’s core agenda.

It is within this context that the EU elected its 10th Parliament (2024-2029). Not coincidentally, these elections were a significant success for populist-conservative parties: Identity & Democracy (ID) and the European Conservatives & Reformists (ECR) made significant gains in France, Germany and Italy. Given the importance of these three countries to the EU – which are the most populous and economically productive in the institution – a transnational alliance of populist Euroscepticism now lies at the heart of the EU.

While the super-grand coalition remains a numerical majority, their position has weakened vis-à-vis populist groups. What is more, division within the EPP – the largest within the Parliament and the party of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – could mean that the numerical majority of the presiding coalition is merely an illusion that may fail to yield consensus at the legislative level on a number of issues, especially on environmental and climate change politics. As such, the EU’s rightward shift may produce legislative paralysis in the next Parliament and a consequent failure to address the challenges facing the continent. 

Amid the fallout of the EU elections, there is a dearth of research that critically subjects the future of environmental and climate change policymaking and the direct implications of the Parliament’s rightward, populist shift. Such a neglect produces a poverty of understanding and foresight that this research paper aims to remedy. The objective of this paper is thus to interrogate the implications of populism on the immediate future of environmental policymaking within the EU, as well as the broader implications of this on international climate cooperation. 

The (Populist) Elephant in the Room

As noted above, the success of populist-conservative parties was the most notable outcome of the European elections. Despite this, populism is often discussed without a definition or explanation. These are necessary in order to critically understand it as a political phenomenon and how it affects climate and environmental politics, by extension. 

Populism is an example of Gallie’s (1956) pioneering articulation of an essentially contested concept, since academics have employed different theoretical lenses to define it and therefore include and exclude different elements in the process of such definition. Despite this, academic literature has recently converged on the prevailing ‘ideational approach’, defining populism as  constructed by two foundational postulates: ‘anti-elitism’ and ‘people-centrism’ (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). The adoption of this definition was primarily a response to the contemporary rise of populism in Britain and the United States, reflected by Brexit and the 2016 Presidential Election, respectively. Anti-elitism and people-centrism are not mutually exclusive, but rather inextricable; representative identities and interests of one necessarily highlights the juxtaposing dynamics of the other. 

Anti-elitism refers to populists’ “negative perceptions of elites as evil and corrupt, and includes the critique of the ‘establishment’; established parties, bureaucrats at different levels, the mainstream media or big capital” (Huber et al., 2021, p. 1000). People-centrism, by contrast, denotes a “glorified and homogenous group with a general will” (Ibid). The abovementioned inextricable nature of these two foundational distinctions stems from the elite serving “as the antagonist to the people”; the elite and the people are thus necessarily in political conflict with one another (Ibid). 

On their own, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ are empty conceptualisations devoid of substantive policies. Therefore, different populisms (left and right) are typically attached to a ‘thick’ host-ideology (traditionally left-wing or right-wing political ideologies), which thereby provides constructing characteristics for each category that shape the underlying ideas and policies toward each (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). This draws attention to an oft-ignored dynamic of populism: left-wing, as well as right-wing parties, can indeed be populist. That being said, it is the case that populist-right parties are more prevalent and more powerful in both European and world politics; Brexit, Donald Trump and the recent success of ID and ECR groups are testament to this. Indeed, “right-wing populism is a longstanding feature of politics in continental European and Anglophone countries” (Lockwood, 2018, p. 1).

When attached to conservative, right-wing host ideologies, conservative populism characterises the elite and the people in terms familiar to observers of contemporary politics. The ‘elite’ are defined as supranational, international polities that advance a cosmopolitan agenda at odds with notions of national sovereignty, as well as the mainstream media that propagates such an agenda. These are seen as, broadly, the ‘establishment’. The people, meanwhile, are defined with reference to traditional understandings of the nation and its native people, along with the inclusion/exclusion of people that fall outside this conceptualisation. Elaborating on and animating these conceptual categories through the real-world example of European conservative-populism, the people are seen as ethnically exclusively (white) Europeans from specific territorially-defined nations who have common interests and, in turn, a common external elite enemy that exists outside of ethnic, national and territorial categories, exemplified by globalising political institutions (the EU) and immigrants. It was these distinctions that broadly defined the Brexit campaign and Trump’s platform, animated by slogans such as ‘take back control’.

In practice, populism constructed along these lines yield familiar political platforms as signified recently by ID and ECR, which see the EU as being at odds with national interests and sovereignty. Climate change and environmental politics, as the following section will highlight, do not evade populism.

Populism in the Environmental Equation

While the presence and influence of populism as a political ideology has always fluctuated across time and space, it has perhaps never been more relevant than in the last decade. Platforms constructed along the categories outlined above necessarily produce policies that are distinct from and contrary to what is considered the mainstream, thus transcending conventional politics and established parties. Climate change and environmental politics are not immune from this; indeed, climate change has been “collateral damage” in the crossfire of emerging populism (Lockwood, 2018, p. 3). The policies of populist-conservative platforms vis-à-vis climate change follow (il)logically from the categories of anti-elitism and people-centrism, which have evolved in confluence with populism’s rise. 

Since climate change is a collective action problem (Ostrom, 2010), the political solution necessarily has an international dimension. This is at odds with populist notions of national sovereignty and interest, which sees national interests as distinct from international goals and collective interests that necessarily contravene the interests of a given nation. This is animated by, for example, the prospect of legally-binding emissions reductions as part of a collective solution to climate change, which are often seen as a threat to economic well-being. Moreover, the people are those within any given nation that do not bear sole responsibility for the causes or consequences of climate change and should not – according to populist argumentation – be burdened by any negative effects of mitigation. This is especially so if other nations are not doing the same. These issues reflect the core of the ongoing political conflict over climate change during its ‘populist moment’ (Marquardt, 2022, p. 736). 

This has been visible within European politics. Gemenis et al. (2012, p. 15) studied the manifestos of 13 right-wing parties in Europe from the late 2000s, finding that “party positions on this issue [anthropogenic global warming] are clearly anti-environmental”. This is reflected contemporarily in ID and ECR, who were openly hostile to the European Green Deal, favouring economic growth over environmental protection (Wood, 2024). The perceptions of electorates across Europe and the platforms of populist parties vis-à-vis climate change are symbiotic; across member-states, there has been conservative reaction to climate activism and their association with policies, which has subsequently been parroted by parties to garner support. Climate change in the ongoing populist moment has thus become “a major battleground for many local, national, and global political forces, turning it into an important cleavage between left and right” (Marquandt & Lederer, 2022, p. 736). This is, moreover, highly polarising, as left versus right reflect radically different platforms: on the left, parties typically see climate change as a serious issue that requires international cooperation; on the right, climate change is either non-occurring or non-serious, and hence does not require mitigating actions or international negotiation. Thus, in spite of the scientific consensus regarding climate change and its causes, climate change has become a highly politicised issue. 

Animating Environmental Populism in the EU

Since the EU Parliament has turned rightward, it is necessary to critically discuss how this may affect the EU as a political institution. The rise of populist groups has implications that go beyond the Parliament, since they threaten to put it and the Commission on opposing sides of the policy debate. Indeed, research shows that right-wing populist parties “predominantly vote against EU energy and climate legislation in the European Parliament” (Huber et al., 2021, p. 1003). This being so, discussion turns towards amalgamating populism, environmental politics and the EU as the site of political contestation over climate and environmental policymaking. 

In doing so, this research paper acknowledges and avoids the depoliticisation of environmental politics produced by orthodox IR theorisation, which occludes the conditioning effect of politics beyond the negotiating areas that typically address the issues of climate and environment (Okereke, 2009). Orthodoxy is an obstacle to more critical understanding, presenting climate change as existing in a political vacuum and an issue unaffected by political or economic interests that may contravene solutions. On the contrary, more critical understandings of climate change politics highlight that it is just one constituent element of the broader whole of global politics (Ibid). Elaborated another way, traditional grand political issues of security and global economic systems are still primary over environmental concerns, receiving prioritised attention from the international community. This sets the boundaries of what is possible for climate and environmental negotiation. Seen this way, climate change is but a peripheral issue, despite it being an existential threat. 

Applying a critical conceptualisation of the EU as a ‘regime of truth’ opens up the possibility that “international organisations are arenas of struggle between global actors over the normative structures that govern (or should govern) specific issue areas” (Newell, 2008: 510), and avoids the occlusion of broader structural dynamics that necessarily condition climate politics. The ontological focus on this conceptualisation is, for the purposes of the following discussion, amended from international and global actors to continental and European states. Applying the conceptualisation of the EU as an example of a ‘regime of truth’ departs from orthodox assumptions that states and the international organisations they populate are neutral as regards environmental policymaking, an assumption which yield misleading insights. 

Given the unique nature of the EU, the implications of not conceptualising it in such a critical light would produce a poverty of understanding. This is demonstrated when acknowledging the multilateral form that is inherent to the institution: with 27 member-states, the EU is an extremely diverse political organisation, comprising states with differing languages, geography, histories, political systems, economic and development status and consequently drastically different capacities and responsibilities to mitigate climate change. Although an imperfect comparison, the EU can be seen as a microcosm of the broader state of international climate cooperation given the parallels of diversity and differentiated responsibilities. 

June’s elections, as well as developments towards the end of the last Parliament, demonstrated that climate change is becoming an increasingly politicised issue. This was, in part, a reaction to the 9th Parliament’s (2019-2024) meaningful progress in passing the European Green Deal, branded by Commission President von Der Leyen as Europe’s “man on the moon moment” (Limon et al., 2024). Despite this progress, there have been calls to slow the process. Indeed, this was a source of significant division within von der Leyen’s party, the EPP, which were expressed at its Congress earlier in 2024. The potential for disunity has since grown following the success of populist-conservative groups, who have been clear about their anti-environmentalist agenda. Consequently, the next Parliament is likely to see political contestation over existing environmental policymaking and its implementation, as well as deliberations over the passage of new legislation. This being so, the next Parliament may oversee a period of stasis vis-à-vis climate and environment, with little subsequent progress made in building on the European Green Deal. Ultimately, this will hamstring the EU’s commitment to be carbon neutral by 2050. 

The next 5 years may, therefore, be the greatest test of the EU as a political union and institution to date, highlighting whether or not it is indeed ‘United in Diversity’. The 10th Parliament will likely see contest between nationalism versus cosmopolitanism, and thereby competing visions of the European project. This threatens the future of not only the EU’s climate agenda, but the international community’s collective effort of which it is a key part. 

‘Intersecting Multilateralisms’ – Europe in the Global Environmental Governance Arena

The EU’s unity is critical to both its internal policymaking and external representation (van Schaik, 2009). Internal unity is constitutive of external environmental diplomacy in a linear, one-directional sense: a strong internal unity makes a coherent external climate posture more likely. The connexion between these two dynamics has been termed ‘intersecting multilateralisms’ (Ibid) by academic literature, highlighting the parallels between the EU and the international negotiation arena(s) alluded to earlier. Such parallels include political and economic asymmetries, differing stages of development and historical relationships with fossil fuels as the dominant mode of production, and therefore alternative capabilities and responsibilities to mitigate and adapt to climate change (Huber, 2009). These points constitute much of the core of the political economy of international cooperation over climate change mitigation that endures today.

The intersection of these has previously produced problems in that the complexity of the EU’s internal policymaking structures and the bodies that comprise the totality of the Union as an institution has had an effect on the “ways in which the Union represents itself externally” prompting “questions about ‘who speaks for the Union’, and the extent to which the Union has developed a coherent line on the reform of international environmental governance” (Volger, 2007 p. 394). The internal complexity of the EU originates in the separation between the Executive (EU Commission) and Legislative (EU Parliament) branches, the necessity of consensus by the Commission in providing ‘one voice’, and differences between member-states on responsibilities and capabilities. Multilateralism is thus a source of complexity and challenge to environmental policymaking, both internally and externally, making the EU’s position in the international negotiation arena uncertain. 

From the perspective of reaching an adequate political solution that affects the “political, social and material relations” (Newell, 2008, p. 508) that cause environment degradation, the history of international climate cooperation has been one of inadequacy. Cooperation at the level of the Conference of the Parties (COP) is in its 33rd year, having started in 1992. Despite this, consecutive COPs have failed to produce meaningful measures or commitments from major emitters to mitigate climate change; major agreements that have been seen as a positive breakthrough have been labelled ‘toothless’ by more critical observers (Clemençon, 2016). As such, the world is likely to go beyond the 1.5C and 2C targets of limiting warming agreed at the Paris Conference in 2015. 

In spite of the scant success of international negotiations since 1994, the EU can – to an extent – hold its collective head high. The EU and its member-states have “pursued international leadership” throughout much of the history of negotiations (Oberthur & Dupont, 2021, p. 1095). Indeed, this was seen during negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol that was agreed in 1997. In the context of resistance from transnational corporations and the recalcitrance of the United States, the EU was critical in obtaining an agreement (Öberthur & Ott, 1999). Notwithstanding the persuasive literature that has critiqued the efficacy of the Kyoto Protocol in mitigating climate change, it reflected a starting point from which to build on – a starting point that had Europe’s diplomatic signature on. The EU subsequently met its emissions reductions targets unanimously, reflecting its commitment and leadership role. This continued in the next major outcome – the Copenhagen Accord – which, although limited in its efficacy, reflected more leadership from the EU in encouraging more ambition and stringency. It is worth noting that, despite the EU’s efforts, it was primarily India and China that blocked more ambitious agreement (Dimitrov, 2010). 

The comparative influence of the EU on the outcome of international negotiations, and the oppositional power of the likes of China and India to affect the same, illuminates to a crucial dimension of international climate and environmental cooperation that is often ignored by orthodox theorisation, but which is becoming more obvious with each year: that of ‘Great Power’ politics in climate change cooperation (Brenton, 2013). Orthodox theorisation conceptualises environmental issues as ‘low politics’ and therefore separate to ‘high politics’ (Goldthau, 2013), that concerned security, conflict and energy. This neglect is futile, producing a misunderstanding of the contemporary nature of global environmental politics. The links between energy (with fossil fuels as its mode of production), security, conflict and the (non)negotiation of significant agreements on mitigation are visible when applying a critical lens, rendering orthodox conceptualisations redundant.

Seen through this lens, the EU’s history in the international negotiation arena is perhaps more impressive when considering the nature of its power in contrast to other states. While it can be considered a ‘Great Power’ in climate politics alongside the likes of the US, China and India (Brenton, 2013), the EU is differentiated by the distinct nature of and consequent limits to its power. The EU does not boast traditional ‘hard power’ policy tools of considerable armed forces or a substantial federal budget (Goldthau, 2013). Thus, its ability to use hard power by use of coercion or payment is limited (Nye, 2004). What is more, it is responsible for less carbon emissions than the Great Powers, which necessarily means that they have less influence as regards mitigation in that its commitment is less impactful. The EU is, therefore, a soft power that affects international politics through the attractiveness of its culture, values, and even the very legitimacy of its foreign policy (Goldthau, 2013) defined by an “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion and payment” (Nye, 2004). Moreover, this power is restricted to the continent and its nearby regions, in which the other great powers are not situated. In the international sphere, the EU is thus termed a ‘normative power’: it offers an example of how international agreements ought to be, shaping the context in which international cooperation takes place. Despite having had considerable influence during the Kyoto phase of international negotiations, the evolution of the very geography of the environmental degradation to be negotiated over has since shifted East (Le Quére et al., 2018), leaving Europe with comparatively less power over how mitigation agreements should look. Europe thus sits awkwardly on the perimeters of the circle of Great Powers, and could drop out of it. This would leave a trifecta of the US, China and India to constitute the core of international negotiations.  

United in Diversity – Europe’s Place in the World

As mentioned earlier, unity is critical to the EU’s place in international negotiation arenas. As a common voice, the EU has been one “of the few actors to consistently argue in favour of institutional reforms and the speedy and accountable implementation of existing commitments” (Volger, 2007, p. 391). This unity has been recognised as reflecting a ‘permissive consensus’ within the institution in the post-Maastricht period (Marquandt & Lederer, 2022). The post-Maastricht consensus is, however, over; the question of the Union thereafter transformed to one of “intensified conflicts over national sovereignty, political identity, and financial redistribution” (Ibid, p. 739), which often occurred in national arenas but which spilled over into the institution at-large. This has been crucial to Brexit and other examples of Euroscepticism that now constitutes the basis of populism within the EU, and threatens the formation of a common external diplomacy by extension. 

The populist undercurrent that operates within the 10th Parliament has pledged to review and perhaps repeal much of the EU’s exemplary progress through the European Green Deal (EGD). This would, however, affect the shape of international negotiation; the legislative agenda of the EGD highlights the EU’s position in the world as both a ‘smart power’ and ‘normative power’ and its example can be the standard for other states to follow, akin to the European Emissions Trading System (ETS). In so being, the EU can offer a microcosm of the political economy of energy transitions to the rest of the world – and especially to the Great Powers – showing that energy transition is not only possible but beneficial by creating new job sectors and clean economic growth. The internal success of the EU is thus crucial to producing change elsewhere, constituting an indispensable part of any ‘grand climate strategy’ that could involve shaping the agreements at the level of the international negotiation arena (Oberthur & Dupont, 2021). 

Populism is a threat to the ‘actorness’ of the EU in international negotiation arenas; the extent to which political forces can affect the EU’s diplomacy by making consensus impossible could offer the next evolution of Europe’s position within this arena, ushering in a post-populist Europe. This may mean that the EU leaves the circle of Great Powers, leaving just the US, China and India to determine the fate of the climate. This necessarily weakens the possibility of reaching an adequate, effective international agreement to address climate change that is fairly shaped by the international community, bringing an age of minilateralism. What is more, this development may occur in the context of the US’ uncertain role in negotiations, since it is witnessing an ongoing populist moment of its own. Should the EU and the US both retreat from the international arena, the hopes of achieving an adequate international agreement during the remainder of the 2020s is effectively nil. In turn, the time lost will make meeting the 1.5C and even 2C targets almost impossible. The possibility of achieving such an agreement rest, in part, on the EU offering a single, coherent voice in the international arena. Populism, of both the European and American type, offers an obstacle to mitigating climate change. 

Remarques finales

The world is approaching perhaps the most critical phase of climate negotiations. If an adequate agreement is not reached during this period, the world will experience substantial climate change. While there is no knowing the exact extent of the effect it will bring, we can be certain that it will significantly alter life on Earth as we know it. 

What agreements have occurred since the UNFCCC’s founding in 1992 have been limited. Despite this, the EU was crucial to both securing and implementing first the Kyoto Protocol and then the Copenhagen and Paris Accords. The threat facing the EU to its internal unity and external diplomacy is something that must be addressed if it is to remain a significant player in international negotiations, and if those negotiations are more likely to produce an agreement that effectively addresses the structural sources of environmental degradation. Internally, the EU doesn’t need to choose between economic development and environmental regulation; each can be achieved by devising smarter policies that promote both. In the context of conservative-populism, this will not be easy. However, climate change is the challenge of our political lifetime; no effort should be spared in the defense of a stable environment. Pursuant of this, the EU can remain a force for good in a world of ever-increasing threats. 

References

Brenton, T. (2013) Great Powers’ Climate Change: An International Political Economy Perspective: Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Clémençon, R. (2016) The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or Historic Breakthrough?: Journal of Environment & Development, 25(1), pp. 3-24.

Dimitrov, R.S. (2010) Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance: Global Environmental Politics, 10(2), pp.18-24.

Gallie, W.B. (1956) Essentially contested concepts: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56, pp. 167-198.

Gemenis, K., Katsanidou, A., Vasilopoulou, S. (2012) The politics of anti-environmentalism: positional issue framing by the European radical right: International Political Science Review, 33(3), pp.300-314.

Goldthau, A. (2013) The Handbook of Global Energy Policy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Huber, M.T. (2009) Energizing historical materialism: Fossil fuels, space and the capitalist mode of production: Geoforum, 40(1), pp. 105-115.

Huber, R.A., Maltby, T., Szulecki, K., Ćetković, S. (2021) Is populism a challenge to European energy and climate policy? Empirical evidence across varieties of populism: Journal of European Public Policy, 28(7), pp. 998-1017. 

IPCC, (2014) Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K. & Meyer, L.A. (eds.)]

Le Quéré, C., et al. (2018) Global Carbon Budget 2018: Earth System Science Data, 10(4), pp. 2141-2194.

Limon, A. R., Biggins, E., Berreta Sartini, I., Wood, H., Geyer, P., Kobayashi, M. (2024) United in Diversity: European Elections 2024. Available at: https://idrn.eu/elections-2024/ [Accessed 23/10/2024].

Lockwood, M. (2018) Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages: Environmental Politics, 27(4), pp. 712-732.

Marquardt, J., Lederer, M. (2022) Politicizing climate change in times of populism: an introduction: Environmental Politics, 31(5), pp. 735-754. 

Mudde, C., Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017) Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Newell, P. (2008) The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance: Review of International Studies, 34(3), pp. 507-529.

Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs.

Oberthür, S., Dupont, C. (2021) The European Union’s international climate leadership: towards a grand climate strategy?: Journal of European Public Policy, 28(7), pp. 1095-1114.

Oberthür, S., Ott, H.E. (1999) The Kyoto Protocol: International Climate Policy for the 21st Century. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Okereke, C. (2009) Climate justice and the international regime: before, during, and after Copenhagen: Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(1), pp. 103-119.

Ostrom, E. (2010) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rooduijn, M., Akkerman, T. (2017) Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe: Party Politics, 23(3), pp.193-204.

van Schaik, L. (2009) The sustainability of the EU’s model for climate diplomacy. In: S. Oberthür, M. Pallemaerts, (eds). The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy. Brussels: VUB Press.

Vogler, J., Stephan, H. (2007) The European Union in Global Environmental Governance: Leadership in the Making? International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 7(4), pp. 389-413.

Wood, H. (2024) ‘United in Diversity’?: The EU’s forthcoming elections and implications for environmental politics, IDRN, 24 May. Available at: https://idrn.eu/united-in-diversity-the-eus-forthcoming-elections-and-implications-for-environmental-politics/ [Accessed: 23/10/2024].