Qatargate: who cares? European voters might not, but practitioners must

07 Mar 2024  –  Written by Lena Raballand

As Qatargate started to unfold in December 2022 and €1.5 million were found with several high-ranking EU individuals, there was a sense that the investigation would take time, but that steps would be taken to address the corrupt network built within the EU.

And yet, over a year later, there are still no convictions, the investigation is losing steam with only five police officers on the case, there are wishy-washy attempts to prevent this from happening again, and even more bizarre insights into this scheme have appeared, including a marijuana business.

Less than 6 months away from the EU Parliamentary elections, will voters care when they go to the polls? Regardless, practitioners and academics shouldn’t let it go. 

What have we learned about the scheme in a year?

Building on last year’s details into the involved family relationships, professional networks, NGOs involved and the start of a money trail, new elements in the network map stick out. 

Perhaps the most shocking advancements is the recusal of the investigative Judge Michel Claise. It was brought to light that his son, Nicholas Claire, is the co-owner of a marijuana business with Ugo Lemaire, the son of Maria Arena, who is another implicated individual. The Belgian prosecutor’s office announced in June 2023 it was “as a precautionary measure, and in order to allow justice to pursue its work in serenity and maintain the necessary separation between private and family life and professional responsibilities.” 

It is concerning that it took over 6 months after the start of the investigation for the Judge to remove himself from the investigation due to a possible conflict of interest. Consequently, it has opened the door to accusations of mishandling in the case from the accused. Eva Kaili’s lawyers arguedthis information, which was not denied, raises enormous and obvious questions about the impartiality of all investigative actions.”  Marc Tarabella’s lawyer alleged Claise was biased from the start against Maria Arena, who has since been interviewed by police, but who remained unquestioned and unaccused for a long time. The judge’s failure to step down sooner has jeopardised the case by giving the accused ammunition to challenge the integrity of the case. 

Since stepping down, there have been hints Claise may try to run in Belgian elections. 

Moreover, the implicated individuals are still paid salaries and have returned to Parliament. Since they’ve been released from prison and house arrest, Kaili, Tarabella and Cozzolino have returned to their seats in Parliament. As they were kicked out of their party, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), they sit as non attached MEPs, but are still paid a salary from the EU budget. Tarabella has decided he will not be running in the 2024 parliamentary elections. 

They have even been allowed to vote on questions of ethics. For example, in a successful parliamentary vote to lift Kaili’s parliamentary immunity in a separate issue regarding her alleged fraud of €150,000 of EU money intended for her former parliamentary assistants, Tarabella voted in favour of lifting it. 

Over the year we’ve also gotten more insight on the steady and staggering amounts of money coming to the pawns of the network. When the arrests were initially made in December 2022, nearly €1.5 million were seized, indicating the kind of amounts flowing through the scheme. Since then, it’s been clear these were not one-off payments.

  • In December 2022, €150,000 was seized in Kaili and Giorgi’s apartment (Kaili later explained to police she kept the cash in a safe “in case of a nuclear attack.”), Kaili’s father was caught with another €150,000 in a suitcase, and €600,000 was found in Panzeri’s home. 
  • After his arrest, Panzeri admitted to receiving €50,000 yearly alongside Giorgi from Morocco in exchange for his lobbying 
  • He also admitted to receiving €17,000 monthly (totalling around €600,000) from Qatar in “classic lobbying” 
  • Combined, Kaili and Giorgi have accumulated over 6 properties with a joint real estate value of more than €1.3 million over two years. 

For some perspective, the monthly salary of an MEP is €10,075.18 gross (€ 7,853.89 net). The average monthly salary across the EU in 2020 was €2,802.25. 

In all, the network has few new faces but more details on the implicated individuals. These details range from evidence of money flows especially regarding Panzeri and Giorgi; strength of connections between implicated individuals such as Maria Arena and Morocco; Eva Kaili offering World Cup tickets to the Parliament President Roberta Metsola, and the comical. According to a former colleague of Panzeri, he had a “penchant for spending parliamentary committee meetings watching YouTube documentaries about plane crashes on his iPad.” 

Even though it already feels like this nightmare should be over, surprises may still lie ahead as the Belgian authorities’ investigation is still ongoing. Apart from Panzeri who struck a plea deal in January 2023, the other individuals involved routinely claim their innocence and have tried to launch attacks against the investigations.

Will EU voters care?

The European Parliament elections are set for Thursday 06 June to Sunday 09 June 2024 with all 720 seats up for grabs. Whether or not Qatargate will have an impact on the elections will firstly depend on how much voters followed European politics ahead of the election. 

Overall, voter turnout in these parliamentary elections every four years has also varied across the Member States as seen below in the 2019 elections.

Nonetheless, there is growing interest in this year’s elections as the European Parliament’s Spring 2023 Eurobarometer survey showed “a clear majority of citizens (56%) are interested in the next European elections, 6 points higher compared to 2018, one year before the last European elections”.

There was some attempt to understand voter’s opinion on the EU’s fight against corruption in the Spring 2024 barometer.

But the reaction also varied across different member states. 

There is some awareness within the EU that Qatargate could be on voters’ minds at the polls. In June 2023, as the EU rolled out its ethics panel, Vera Jourva, the Commission Vice President for values and transparency commented “next week, the voters will be yawning… People are suffering in Europe, and they don’t want to see privileges.” 

However, Qatargate and corruption might not be the top priority for voters either. In a March 2023 survey, the most important topics to voters were peace, protecting citizen’s rights, and climate change:  

In sum, Qatargate could reinforce voter’s perception that the EU and the Parliament is a corrupt body not worth participating in. If the voting apathy is surpassed, it could push voters towards anti-establishment parties or play a minor role as other topics such as peace, climate change, and migration drive the voter’s choices. 

Why should practitioners and academics care?

Regardless of the impact on voters, practitioners, academics and civil society should not let the wishy washy response slide. The EU’s actions to prevent another Qatargate are difficult to identify but boil down to the following: 

  • A repurposed committee with a comically long name (“Special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation, and the strengthening of integrity, transparency and accountability in the European Parliament) 
  • Reform to Parliament’s procedures through a majority vote by MEPs after Parliament President Roberta Metsola floated 14 proposals to the Conference of Presidents in January 2023 including (1) a cooling off period for MEPs who wish to lobby Parliament when they are no longer in office, (2) mandatory registration in the Transparency Register for any event with participation of interest representatives in the EP and (3) a ban on friendship groups with third countries where official Parliamentary interlocutors already exist and that could cause confusion. (Why such measures were not in place prior to Qatargate is concerning).

There was also successful pressure to reduce the cooling off period on lobbying for former parliamentarians from the originally proposed two years to six months undermining the measure’s effectiveness according to EU Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly.

  • Removing lower staff from the WhoisWho so they cannot be targets of influence.   
  • Some guidelines approved by leading MEPs including urging MEPs and staffers to request Parliament’s permission to invite the countries’ diplomats onto the premises. None of these guidelines are binding. 
  • An ethics panel with no investigative powers to oversee the ethical standards to be individually drawn up by the nine European institutions. 

In June 2023, the EU unveiled an advisory board to harmonise standards across the nine European institutions to create and enforce “binding commitments to implement common ethics standards for political officials working in them.” However, in July a vote within Parliament on a nonbinding measurecalling for an ethics cop with more power to investigate and punish breaches passed with 365 votes in favour — but 270 MEPs rejected the resolution”, due to party disputes. As they were allowed to return to Parliament, albeit as independent MEPs, both Kaili and Tarabella voted on this issue and both agreed that the Commission’s plan for a panel with no investigative powers was not a strong enough response. 

In sum over the last year, holding individuals accountable has been seriously jeopardised by the foolishly late recusal of Judge Claise due to proximity with individuals involved. Moreover, Qatargate may play a role in the upcoming European Parliament elections by reinforcing individual’s views of the EU as a corrupt body. However, corruption might not be the most important topic to voters either. Regardless of voter’s opinions, practitioners and civil society need to push Parliament to address integrity through effective reform such as an ethics panel with investigative powers. 

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Recommended citation:

Raballand, L. (2024) Qatargate: who cares? European voters might not, but practitioners must, IDRN, 07 March. Available at:  [Accessed dd/mm/yyyy].