Messaging Mayhem: The EU's Struggle for Clarity on Israel-Palestine

I. Introduction 

Few long-standing conflicts evoke such intense discussions and foreign policy debates as Israel-Palestine, be it within or between the European Union’s 27 member states – informed by differing historical and political backgrounds. Therefore, the presence of a wide variety of viewpoints should not come as a surprise. And yet, the EU’s overall response to the unfolding geopolitical and humanitarian crisis in Israel-Palestine since the 7 October Hamas’ attacks has been shocking in the sheer magnitude of repeated mis-coordination. Twelve years after the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), a crisis of credibility casts long shadows over the EU’s aspirations for a cohesive and unified Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This Insight Piece will elucidate the contradictions on display and analyse the implications for Brussels’ vaunted efforts to become a geopolitical actor.

II. The EU’s Communication Chaos: An Overview

The messaging ‘cacophony’ in Brussels commenced on the 9 October when the Hungarian Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, announced a review and suspension of all EU financial aid to Palestine. The Commission immediately walked the announcement back; Várhelyi had neither consulted the College of Commissioners nor the EU Council. Completing the U-turn, the Commission instead tripled – and subsequently quadrupled – humanitarian aid to Gaza. Yet, the Commission’s coordination issues extended beyond Várhelyi.  

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen soon came under fire from Member States, EU Parliament members, and Commission staff for how she conducted her 13 October trip to Israel together with EU Parliament President Roberta Metsola. Specifically, the message of unconditional support did not reflect the 10 October EU Council Conclusions, which, in addition to condemning Hamas’ attacks, also called for restraint, the release of hostages, and “for allowing access to food, water and medicines to Gaza.” In a call with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, publicly disavowed von der Leyen as not speaking for the EU. Accusations emerged that EU Council President Charles Michel had neither been invited to join nor consulted about the trip, with an ensuing extraordinary Council meeting organised to bring a semblance of CFSP coherence. Michel’s position was notably closer to Borrell’s in condemning the 7 October attack while explicitly stressing the limitations to Israel’s self-defence under international and humanitarian laws. He emphasised that the distressing situation in Gaza, with civilians actively deprived of basic needs like water, food, and electricity, along with the siege and “the destruction brought about by significant shelling,” were ”not in line with international law”. 

Yet, overly hasty messaging was not limited to the Commission, as Borrell prematurely announced a “basic consensus” among member states for a “humanitarian pause” to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza – when such a consensus did not exist. After much diplomatic wrangling over the legal semiotics of “ceasefire” and “humanitarian pause(s),” Member States ultimately agreed to call for “humanitarian corridors and pauses” in plural to clarify their finite temporality. The deep fault lines could not be contained and were fully exposed amid the UN General Assembly vote for a ceasefire on the 27 October, when eight member states voted in favour; 15 abstained; and four voted against. Afterwards, EU capitals increasingly staked out their own positions on the spiralling crisis.  

To mention but a few illustrative examples: Standing firmly with Israel, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was confident the Israeli Defense Forces would respect international law, mirroring similarly oblique language by the Biden Administration. Conversely, Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar suggested there were “double standards” within the EU regarding Ukraine and Israel-Palestine. Meanwhile, Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez, heading the EU Council Presidency, called for an end to “the indiscriminate killing of Palestinians.” And somewhere in between stood French President Emmanuel Macron, whose ambiguous diplomatic posture was criticised from within his own Foreign Ministry as “pro-Israeli” one day and “pro-Palestinian” the next. 

This cacophony of voices only threw further doubts on what coherent EU position could exist. Though incremental steps were taken towards a more unified front, including the 15 November EEAS blog post “What the EU stands for on Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” they have not been helped by uninterrupted institutional divergences. Mere days before Borrell outlined the EEAS’ six principles for peace – the three yeses and three noes – von der Leyen unexpectedly outlined the Commission’s own proposal for five principles to guide a post-war settlement.  

III. Disunity by Design or Choice? 

The messaging debacle over the Israel-Palestine crisis not only brought to light the internal divisions within the EU over foreign policy, but also exposed underlying institutional tensions related to the Union’s external representation – both having far-reaching consequences. It leaves many question marks regarding Brussels’ ambitions for a “geopolitical Europe” that carries more weight in international affairs and becomes a “stronger and more capable security provider.” While the EU’s approach to Ukraine initially showcased the potential for such a geopolitical Europe, the division, lack of coordination and stumbling response to the unfolding events in the Middle East now cast a shadow over that premise.  

The CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy, defined in detail by the EU Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, with decisions related to foreign policy requiring the unanimity of its member states. The explosive disagreements over Israel-Palestine sharply showcase the challenges in finding unanimity from 27 member states for action; when consensus proves elusive, inherent difficulties arise in effectively addressing global crises. And while member states have varying preferences on EU integration, the vision for a more unified CFSP likely hinges on surrendering this unanimity requirement in favor of qualified majority voting procedures. Considering ongoing discussions regarding EU treaty reform amid enlargement pressures, it remains uncertain whether the latest messaging debacle will add momentum to reform, or instead push member states to guard their foreign policy prerogatives ever-more closely, with heightened sensitivity to diverging foreign policy preferences. 

An additional and now even more visible fault line is the personality-driven divides between the Council’s, the EEAS’s, and the Commission’s heads, with accusations against von der Leyen for overstepping her job description. Von der Leyen’s supporters may label her outspokenness as leadership; Commission Chief Spokesperson Eric Mamer notably defended her Israel trip, saying “no one criticised von der Leyen for going to Ukraine and Bucha.” However, critics countered that the Commission blindsided both the Council and the EEAS, thereby “cutting EU governments out.” Either way, it demonstrates how the lines have blurred regarding institutional competencies, external representation, and EU leadership. It is an open secret that the relationship between von der Leyen and Michel has been strained ever since the 2021 Sofagate incident, with a suffering inter-institutional balancing act – particularly in times of crisis. 

Though the contours of a collective response to the Gaza crisis appear to be gradually materialising, the slow pace is imposing reputational costs amid an already bleak outlook. Even before 7 October, global polling by the European Council on Foreign Relations found growing doubts about EU long-term political survival both outside and within Europe, with “Geopolitical EU” remaining “little more than a slogan.” Such sentiments are unlikely to be helped by the perplexing array of EU and member state responses, nor by the mounting accusations of double standards from Global South countries that perceive EU indecisiveness as complicit in the surging civilian death count in Gaza. The EU’s inability to speak clearly with one voice has thus not only diminished the coherence and credibility of the CFSP but also further highlighted the Union’s systematic shortcomings. 

IV. Looking Ahead

There are three key developments to monitor going forward into 2024 – an EU election year – regarding the CFSP. Firstly, whether the institutional rivalries will accentuate or taper off between the Commission, the EEAS and the Council. Second, to what extent will the EU Council Presidency seek to steer the agenda more closely on the crisis. Though the Council Presidency is informally supposed to favour neutrality, the current and incoming presidencies – Spain and Belgium – notably have more outspoken positions vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine. Lastly, it will be crucial to observe what scars the coming weeks may leave on the momentum for the EU enlargement and reform agenda.